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ABSTRACT 
 
Zachary Tewell: Digital Discourse, Online Repression, and Cyberterrorism: Information 
Communication Technologies in Russia’s North Caucasus Republics 
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) 
 
 
 Is the “cyber-utopian” versus “cyber-repression” argument the most effective way 
to frame the political uses of new technologies? Contemporary discourse on social media 
fails to highlight political dynamics in authoritarian regimes with weak state control, 
where independent groups can capitalize on the use of coercive force. In this thesis I will 
explore the various methods through which information communication technologies are 
utilized by civil groups, uncivil groups, and the state using Russia’s North Caucasus 
republics as a case study. New technologies are exploited through a variety of means by 
an array of actors in the North Caucasus whose goals may not necessarily be democratic. 
Through this evidence I demonstrate that information communication technologies do not 
inherently aid democratization, nor do they necessarily aid the incumbent regime; rather, 
they are merely a conduit through which existing groups put forth their agendas regarding 
their ideals of the modern state. 
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Introduction 
The adoption of faster communication technologies has historically been linked to 
questions about how they may influence a state’s transition towards democracy. During 
the Cold War, newfound communication technologies, such as fax machines and 
photocopiers, were smuggled into the Soviet Union in the hope that they would promote 
the proliferation of samizdat (anti-Soviet literature produced domestically).1 Larry 
Diamond refers to information communication technologies (hereafter referred to as 
ICTs) as “liberation technology.” He elaborates, “Liberation technology is any form of 
information and communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social, and 
economic freedom…the computer, the Internet, the mobile phone, …[and] ’new social 
media’ such as Facebook and Twitter”.2 
New media types, though a relatively recent phenomenon, have typically been 
examined in the contexts of open democracies. However, after the events of the Arab 
Spring in 2011, analysts began studying the use of ICTs in non-democratic environments. 
In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, social media3 had a measurable impact. Though ICTs 
did not contribute to the social and political inequality between the populations and elites, 
their use catalyzed internal uprisings capable of regime overthrow.4 Revolutionary ideals 
were fomented, articulated, and spread across borders by the use of sites such as Twitter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Morozov, Evgeny. The Net Delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom. PublicAffairs Store, 201 
 
2 Diamond, Larry. "Liberation technology." Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 (2010): 69-83. 70 
 
3 In this work I use the terms ICTs and social media interchangeably for stylistic variation. 
 
4 Stepanova, Ekaterina. The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the 'Arab Spring': 
PONARS Eurasia, 2011. 
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and Facebook.5 Yet, in the cases of Moldova6 and Iran,7 online-based social movements 
failed to galvanize a viable opposition or generate enough political momentum to topple 
the incumbent regimes. Ultimately, in the latter cases, the movements eventually 
dispersed; in Iran’s case, domestic social media users who protested against the regime 
were tracked down, intimidated, and in some instances even killed.8  
The dynamic above highlights the debate among social scientists as to the role of 
social media in non-democratic regimes: do ICTs promote democratization or merely aid 
incumbent authoritarian regimes in oppressing their populations? So-called “cyber 
utopians9” lie on one end of the ideological spectrum, espousing optimistic rhetoric, 
predicting that an online public space would offer a free-flow of democratic ideals and 
ultimately have a democratizing effect on authoritarian regimes. Clay Shirky writes, 
“New media conducive to fostering participation can indeed increase…freedoms…just as 
the printing press, the postal service, the telegraph, and the telephone did before.”10 
 In contrast to analysts like Shirky are “skeptics”, such as Evgeny Morozov who 
argue that social media mechanisms allow another avenue for a state to repress its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Howard, Philip N., Aiden Duffy, Deen Freelon, Muzammil Hussain, Will Mari, and Marwa Mazaid. 
"Opening closed regimes: what was the role of social media during the Arab Spring?." Working Paper 
(2011). 
 
6 Morozov, Evgeny. “Moldova’s twitter revolution is not a myth.” Accessed December 8, 2013.  
http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/10/moldovas_twitter_revolution_is_not_a_myth. 
 
7 Burns, Alex, and Ben Eltham. "Twitter-free Iran: An evaluation of Twitter's role in public diplomacy and 
information operations in Iran's 2009 election crisis." (2009): 322-334. 
 
8 Ibid., 306. 
 
9 Cyber-utopianism is a logical extension of the ideology of technological optimism, itself a complex and 
multi-faceted set of beliefs that has existed for decades. For more information on this belief set, see 
Gendron’s “Technology and the Human Condition.” 
 
10 Shirky, Clay. "The Political Power of Social Media-Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political 
Change." Foreign Affairs. 90 (2011): 28. 
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citizens. ICTs, in this view, offer authoritarian regimes alternative methods to gather 
information on dissidents and ultimately strengthen the coercive apparatus of the state.11 
Malcolm Gladwell also disputes the revolutionary attributes of new media types. In a 
piece for the New Yorker he writes that social media technologies may indeed increase 
participation, but they do so by devaluing the act of participation itself. For example, the 
new norm of “activism” has been reduced to online group membership rather than actual 
protest or civic engagement.12 
I argue that this debate is limited in scope and oversimplifies a complex social 
dynamic. Much attention has been paid to the digital interactions between two primary 
actors: the state and civil society; however, this focus neglects a third important actor, 
uncivil society. Uncivil society groups are organizations independent from the state that 
advocate against democratizing reforms. These groups often advocate intimidation and 
violence as legitimate tools of exerting influence on both the state and local civil society 
organizations.13  
In this thesis, I argue that the proliferation of ICTs has affected the political 
situation in Russia’s North Caucasus region14 in three key aspects. First, ICTs alone do 
not inherently aid in transitioning a regime in a democratic direction. Second, existing 
social groups utilize ICTs to the extent to which they will assist in promoting their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Morozov, The net delusion: The dark side of Internet freedom. 
 12	  Gladwell, Malcolm. "Small Change: Why the Revolution will not be Tweeted." The New Yorker, 
accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell?currentPage=all. 
 
13 This conception will be elaborated upon in the “Uncivil Society” chapter. 	  
14 The North Caucasus, for the purposes of this work, is defined as the autonomous republics of Dagestan, 
Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, and Chechnya, all located in the 
North Caucasian Federal District of Russia. Additionally, due to demographic similarities, I also include 
two members of the Southern Federal District, Adygeya and Krasnodar Krai.  
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individual ideologies; in other words, present civil society and authoritarian dynamics 
determine the role of ICTs in promoting democratic ideals, not the inverse. Third, uncivil 
society groups are also emboldened by the preponderance of ICTs, and use them to 
damage the influence of both civil society actors and the state. In particular, this thesis 
demonstrates the triangular relationship between civil society groups, the state, and 
uncivil society using ICTs; all three groups use ICTs in varying ways to advance their 
respective agendas.  
The dynamic between uncivil society and civil groups and the state is not 
captured in contemporary studies on social media use in authoritarian regimes. The 
purpose of this work is not to side with either the cyber-utopian or pessimistic camps, or 
to ascribe a “positive” or “negative” role for ICTs on democratization. Rather the goal is 
to illustrate the complex and varied uses of ICTs among a wide variety of actors in Russia 
as well as to advance the notion of studying illiberal groups not as a subset of civil 
society, but as a set of actors that behave in a categorically different way from traditional 
civil society groups. Finally, this thesis sheds new light on an understudied portion of 
Russia. Though scholarship exists examining the role of ICTs in Russia in larger 
metropolitan areas such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg, little research has been 
conducted solely in the North Caucasus republics.  
This thesis will be mapped out as follows. First, I will examine ICTs in a 
theoretical context, specifically in terms of Robert Putnam’s theory of social capital. 
Within this framework I will present previous scholarship related to the political impact 
of the proliferation of ICTs among a variety of groups. Following this, I will examine 
North Caucasian civil society’s use of ICTs. Next, I will look at how the political elites in 
5	  	  
the North Caucasian republics use ICTs to suppress civil society and deal with the local 
insurgency. Next, I will identify and analyze the “uncivil” portion of North Caucasian 
civil society; within this section I will also examine the use of ICTs by these illiberal 
groups to suppress democratic ideals espoused by civil society as well as attack state 
resources. Finally, I will address future areas for study and research questions posed by 
my analysis. 
 
Social Capital and its Link to ICTs 
What are some of the theoretical arguments surrounding the effects of ICTs? Put 
differently, do ICTs provide any added social or political value beyond new forms and 
methods of communication? Contemporary scholarship on the relationship between 
nascent information networks and society demonstrates a rise in the social capital of 
Internet users. In the following section, I will present existing research on the link 
between social capital and ICTs, as well as draw a link between social capital, ICTs, and 
democratization. Furthermore, I will expound upon some of the unintended consequences 
brought about by the proliferation of ICTs among strong authoritarian states and illiberal 
groups. 
First, what is social capital and why is critical for academic examination? Robert 
Putnam refers to social capital as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity that arise 
from them.”15 However, social capital measures more than just the sum of one’s 
interpersonal network; it can also translate into demonstrative behavioral changes at the 
individual level. For example, it increases the likelihood of becoming involved in local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York, NY: 
Touchstone, 2000. 	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and national level political communities. Shah et al. provide a more nuanced definition: 
“…social capital concerns psychological and sociological factors that, while not 
explicitly political, have implications for political functioning.”16 More broadly defined, 
gains in social capital can result in a larger sense of self-worth and contentment, a 
strengthening of interpersonal networks, and greater civic engagement. For the purposes 
of this work, I will expand upon Shah et al.’s characterization of social capital and use it 
to describe the political implications that come from extended interpersonal relationships 
and associational memberships. 
If researchers have established social capital as critical to interaction with broader 
local communities, does this associational involvement have an influence upon 
governance? A study on Italy in the 1970’s noted disparities in the success of regional 
institutions; some created widely popular public programs, while others remained corrupt 
and inefficient in the eyes of the public. Controlling for ideologies, political parties, and 
governmental organization the one key difference was that associational involvements 
(e.g. group membership, the number of local organizations) and civic engagement (e.g. 
the number of newspaper readers, voter turnout) was higher in the regions with more 
transparent governments.17 Increased social capital served as the mechanism to increase 
popular demand for political accountability and ultimately led to citizens reporting higher 
satisfaction with their elected officials.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Shah, Dhavan V., Nojin Kwak, R. Lance Holbert, Dhavan. "'Connecting' and 'Disconnecting' with Civic 
Life: Patterns of Internet use and the Production of Social Capital." Journal of Political Communication 2, 
(18, 2001): 141-162. 
 
17 Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.  
 18	  Ibid.	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Increased social capital can aid in local political participation and spread 
knowledge of local political issues. This increased associational participation can help 
solve collective action problems that may otherwise prevent citizens from making clear 
demands on their local governments. Moreover, increased social capital in populations 
can also lead to easier governance and higher instances of people adhering to the rules 
and norms set forth by local institutions. Practical instances of this could be noted as 
citizens paying taxes in full and on time or following a local anti-littering ordinance.19 
Importantly, a rise in social capital and the ensuing associational involvement are 
linked to the development of a strong civil society. The increased trust networks created 
by the diffusion of social norms and reciprocity ultimately reduce the transaction costs to 
associational involvement; the requirement to create contracts and fears of free-riding are 
assuaged when social capital increases. Fukuyama notes, “An abundant stock of social 
capital is presumably what produces a dense civil society, which in turn has been almost 
universally seen as a necessary condition for modern liberal democracy…Civil society 
serves to balance the power of the state and to protect individuals from the state’s 
power.”20 From this estimation, civil society is less likely to flourish under conditions 
where degrees of social capital are low.  
Now that we have established that social capital is one of the primary mechanisms 
through which civil society is developed, what are the roles of ICTs in developing this 
capital? In an American survey of 39,000 Internet users in 1998, higher Internet usage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Boix, Carles and Daniel N. Posner. "Social Capital: Explaining its Origins and Effects on Government 
Performance." British Journal of Political Science 28, no. 4 (1998): 686-693. 
 
20 Fukuyama, Francis. "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda." SAIS Review 22, no. 1 
(2002): 23-37. 
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positively correlated with associational involvement and political participation.21 Further, 
online organizational participation correlated with offline group involvement as well.22 
Survey data from 2007 of college Internet users demonstrated, that while it was not the 
main predictor of activity, online social network activity was correlated with civic 
participation.23 Further, ICTs were found, in one study, to be more engaging and 
mobilizing than traditional media sources. Shah et al. write, “Online information seeking 
and interactive civic messaging – uses of the Web as a resource and a forum – both 
strongly influence civic engagement, often more so than do traditional print and 
broadcast media and face-to-face communication.”24  
Researchers discovered a link in the United States between social media usage 
and civic participation.25 In survey data gathered from the United States in 2009, social 
media users who engaged with sites for news and information felt more civically engaged 
and a stronger development of social capital. In other words, when citizens utilized social 
media sites (such as Facebook) for information gathering, they were ultimately more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Wellman, Barry, Anabel Quan Haase, James Witte, and Keith Hampton. 2001. "Does the Internet 
Increase, Decrease, Or Supplement Social Capital? Social Networks, Participation, and Community 
Commitment." American Behavioral Scientist 45 (3): 436-455. 
 
22 Though this data is useful for the purposes of this work, the study itself addresses a very small sample of 
the North American population. For example, in 1998 only 41% of adults were online.  Combined with the 
fact that over 40% of the members of this sample was college-educated persons earning over $50,000 per 
year. For more information, see http://www.pewinternet.org/2007/06/21/the-internet-circa-1998/. 	  
23 Valenzuela, Sebastián, Namsu Park, and Kerk F. Kee. "Is there Social Capital in a Social Network Site?: 
Facebook use and College Students' Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Participation." Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication 14, no. 4 (2009): 875-901. 
 
24 Shah, Dhavan V., Jaeho Cho, William P. Eveland, and Nojin Kwak. "Information and Expression in a 
Digital Age: Modeling Internet Effects on Civic Participation." Communication Research 32, no. 5 (2005): 
531-565. 551. 
 
25 Zhang, Weiwu, Thomas J. Johnson, Trent Seltzer, and Shannon L. Bichard. "The Revolution Will be 
Networked: The Influence of Social Networking Sites on Political Attitudes and Behavior." Social Science 
Computer Review 28, no. 1 (2010): 75-92. 
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likely to foster democratic ideals and participate more in the democratic process through 
mechanisms such as voting and political group involvement.26 ICTs are a mechanism 
through which new relationships are built and existing social networks strengthened. 
How does social capital apply to actors outside of liberal democracies? Do the 
same dynamics apply to fledgling democracies or under authoritarian rule? Inferring from 
the criteria above, researchers originally posited that increases in social capital would 
result in democratizing effects on regimes. This has proven the case in Russia during 
Boris Yeltsin’s rule as president. As was the case in Italy, social capital in Russia varies 
widely by region. Social capital in the regions was measured by an index of voter turnout, 
independent newspapers, and numbers of clubs and cultural associations. The higher 
degree of social capital in a Russian region determined the effectiveness of its 
government, based upon indicators such as political competition and political 
participation in voting for individual candidates as well as referenda turnouts. Areas with 
lower degrees of social capital elected incompetent or corrupt officials and led to a higher 
degree of governmental dissatisfaction.27  
Individual Internet use was also found to be a strong indicator of demand for 
democratic institutions, although only under a particular set of conditions. In a 28 country 
survey in Africa and Asia, researchers noted that as individual Internet use increased 
individuals were “socialized” towards democratic ideals. However, this phenomenon was 
present only when some sort of democracy already existed in the country. Less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Nakwon Jung, and Sebastián Valenzuela. "Social media use for news and 
individuals' social capital, civic engagement and political participation." Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 17, no. 3 (2012): 319-336. 
 
27 Marsh, Christopher. "Social Capital and Democracy in Russia." Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies 33, no. 2 (2000): 183-199. 
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democratic states (i.e. those that were listed as “Not Free” on FreedomHouse scores) 
were less likely to evince this trend.28 This study suggests that ICTs may not necessarily 
help spread democratic ideals intrinsically, but rather reinforces existing principles 
espoused by certain groups. 
Heeks and Seo-Zindy analyze digital media tools in an actor-centered 
perspective29 under Iran’s authoritarian leadership. Specifically, they outline the role of 
such tools in the development of social movement networks under authoritarian rule. 
They find that ICTs allow a freer flow of ideas as well as a larger audience for such ideas 
that may not have been possible under older forms of communication. However, the 
technologies also prevented the creation of a unified leadership structure, limited 
engagement with the opposition, and allowed protestors to be more easily identifiable.30 
Ultimately, in Iran’s case, social media did aid in creating opposition networks, but such 
networks were flimsy, spontaneous, and lacked the capacity to maintain themselves over 
time. The authors point out, “…[T] his loose structure weakened the depth of translation 
of interests and identities within the protestors, and weakened the ability of the protestors 
to translate the interests and identities of other actors in practice.”31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Nisbet, Erik C., Elizabeth Stoycheff, and Katy E. Pearce. "Internet use and Democratic Demands: A 
Multinational, Multilevel Model of Internet use and Citizen Attitudes about Democracy." Journal of 
Communication 62, (2012): 249-265. 
 29	  This concept frames ICTs as an actor in a broader network, noting their distribution contributes to 
interactions among actors, and not necessarily cause and effect. In this context, ICTs are not a static 
phenomenon, but rather a dynamic “actor.”	  	  
30 Heeks, Richard, and Ryoung Se-Zindy. "ICTs and Social Movements under Authoritarian Regimes: An 
Actor-Network Perspective." UK Academy for Information Systems Conference Proceedings (2013). 
 
31 Ibid., 19 
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Chief among the assumptions of “cyber utopians” is that civil society is inherently 
democratic. Alagappa, in studying civil society among twelve Asian countries draws 
several conclusions regarding its role in democratization.32 Chiefly, there are no 
correlations between civil society and democratizing reforms. He notes, “Civil society 
groups have both expanded and contracted democratic space.”33 Not all civil society 
groups promote democratic ideals; some groups espouse exclusivist, nationalistic, and 
racist rhetoric that is counterproductive to establishing and maintaining a liberal 
democracy. Thus, we can expect that only when democracy is the prominent ideal 
espoused by groups will civil societies lead to democratization. Francis Fukuyama 
explores the effects of social capital on group coherence, noting that there are both 
positive and negative dimensions involved: 
Social capital within a particular network or group can produce positive 
externalities by teaching people social virtues such as honesty, reciprocity, and 
dependability that they can then apply to relationships with other people…On the 
other hand, human beings have a tendency to build ‘in-group’ solidarity at the 
expense of outsiders; thus societies with many tightly bonded groups or networks 
may be fragmented and rife with conflicts and hostility when viewed as a whole.34 
 
Group inclusiveness is important to note among the growth of civil society organizations. 
If groups tend to remain positively engaged with the broader political and social 
community (that is, if there is no rhetoric that creates or exacerbates cleavages among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Democratization in this sense refers to the transition of a non-democratic regime (such as a one-party, 
military, or dynastic authoritarian rule) to a system of governance based on codified rule of law, multi-party 
elections that are free and fair, and universal human suffrage. 	  
33 Alagappa, Muthia, ed. 2004. Civil Society and Political Change in Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
34 Fukuyama, Francis. "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda." 
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social or ethnic boundaries), they can transcend social boundaries, increase tolerance, and 
stimulate reciprocity networks.35 
Can the acquisition of social capital and increase in political participation foster 
anti-democratic attitudes, intolerance and even violence as well as create associations 
inimical to the democratic process?  As noted above, inclusive groups can bridge gaps 
between isolated populations and reduce transaction costs for cooperation; however, 
exclusive groups, while having high intra-relational social capital, can serve to further 
isolate populations, as well as exacerbate existing social and ethnic cleavages that may 
ultimately hinder the democratic process. Paxton elaborates, “The internal social capital 
of other highly member-oriented associations could help mobilize members in favor of 
policy innovations that do not benefit the community as a whole.”36 
Democratic participation does not necessarily lead to a preponderance of liberal 
ideals. Putnam notes that in the United States polarized votes, those who lie on the 
farthest ends of the political spectrum are 50% more likely to vote than moderates.37 
Indeed, civic participation does not necessarily create conditions favorable towards 
democratization. In fact, the opposite phenomenon can occur under certain conditions. 
Sheri Berman reminds us that in the case of the Weimar Republic, the political 
predecessor to the German Third Reich from 1919 to 1933, German civic engagement 
and associational involvement was quite high. However, this condition in the presence of 
weak state institutions led to the rise of undemocratic principles, and eventually Nazism. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Paxton, Pamela. "Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship." American 
Sociological Review 67, no. 2 (2002): 254-277. 
 36	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Berman writes, “…high levels of associationism [sic], absent strong and responsive 
national government and political parties, served to fragment rather than unite German 
society.”38 Berman’s work demonstrates the significance of civil society’s role in 
undermining democratic institutions; the presence of a strong civil society was not a 
sufficient factor for maintaining a fledgling democracy in interwar Germany.  
Indeed, civil society groups are not always democratic and they do not necessarily 
use ICTs to promote democratic notions. The nature of social media, analyst Robin 
Thompson elaborates, “[Social media]…easily connects people very quickly with a wide 
audience, the synergy creates a movement en masse of like-minded persons. A leader is 
not needed. Ideas are exchanged and people choose to act on them – or not. Groupthink is 
a very powerful force.”39 Indeed, there is no distinction as to the types of ideals that can 
be acted upon due to ICTs. Both democratic and anti-democratic rhetoric can become a 
galvanizing force, and one is no more likely than the other to be espoused through the use 
of technology.  
Contemporary Russia provides a sample of uncivil use of new technologies. Nashi 
(ours) a youth wing of the dominant United Russia party utilizes unorthodox methods to 
discredit information considered unflattering to Putin’s administration and allies. Rather 
than foster democratic dialogue or participation, the group instead uses ICTs to serve the 
interests of Putin’s authoritarian regime. For example, Internet users are paid to write 
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inflammatory comments on particular articles or hit the “dislike” button on YouTube 
videos from opposition activists.40  
Authoritarian states are also overcoming the learning curve to technology, and 
have begun to use them to their advantage. Oppressive states are adopting a new 
paradigm for addressing popular use of the Internet, which Rebecca MacKinnon deems 
“networked authoritarianism.” Citizens living under networked authoritarian regimes 
enjoy many of the online freedoms seen in open democracies; degrees of dissent are even 
tolerated online. However, as new communication technologies have the ability to 
mobilize populations against regimes, they can also dissuade and intimidate populations 
from political involvement.41  
In studying online media in contemporary Azerbaijan, Pearce and Kendzior 
outline several preliminary findings. First, in 2009 the authors found that Internet users 
were more likely to support anti-government protests. However, later that year 
Azerbaijani authorities arrested two producers of a YouTube video which parodied the 
incumbent and oppressive Aliyev regime. Though the producers were released months 
later, the message was clear: cyberspace in Azerbaijan was no longer a free arena for 
opposition.42 The effects of the Aliyev regime’s actions were noticeable almost 
immediately; news of the arrests went viral on Azerbaijani digital media platforms. 
Azerbaijani media outlets controlled by the regime embarked on a campaign to 
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discourage Azerbaijani youth from using social media. Ultimately, Azerbaijani Internet 
users became less likely to mobilize and protest after the government action against 
opposition bloggers.43 
So can we take it that ICTs have a net positive or negative effect on the 
democratization of a regime? The evidence presented above certainly disputes that 
notion. Though ICTs advance levels of social capital, this result may not necessarily 
democratize; indeed, though civil groups may benefit from increased associational 
involvement, authoritarian states and uncivil actors may use these new methods of 
communication to stall and demobilize democratic reforms. The inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness of civil society group dynamics influences how they will use ICTs, rather 
than ICTs themselves influencing group ideology. In the following sections, I will present 
evidence from Russia’s North Caucasus to demonstrate the interactions between civil 
society, the state, and uncivil groups using ICTs as a medium for their ideology and 
rhetoric.   
 
Civil Society and the Use of ICTs 
 According to the technological optimists, one of the purported benefits of ICT 
proliferation was their aid in expanding civil society and the media sphere in closed 
regimes. Diamond writes, “[ICTs] may help to widen the public sphere, creating a more 
pluralistic and autonomous arena of news, commentary, and information. The new ICTs 
are also powerful instruments for transparency and accountability, documenting and 
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deterring abuses of human rights and democratic procedures.”44 These benefits have 
largely been present in the North Caucasus. In the section, I will demonstrate how the 
proliferation of ICTs has advanced traditional civil society organizations in the North 
Caucasus through various means. 
 Civil society itself is a broad category that includes a wide variety of actors and 
organizations. Marc Howard writing on civil society in Russia noted that although many 
civil society groups have a goal of influencing policy and the state bureaucracy they 
“have neither power nor profit as their objective or rationale.”45 In the case of the North 
Caucasus, civil society groups encompass those independent from state sponsorship. 
Typically, civil society in the area takes the shape of human rights organizations, 
independent media outlets, and ethnic advocacy groups.  
New ICTs have served multiple functions for civil society organizations in the 
North Caucasus. First, they have allowed existing groups an extended sphere of influence 
for the distribution of information. Within such a sphere, civil society groups are able to 
compete more successfully with the information campaigns of the state and uncivil 
groups. 
 When Russia invaded Chechnya in 1994, Akhmed Zakayev immediately joined 
the Chechen resistance, fighting against the Russian occupation. Later, he embarked upon 
a lucrative political career; eventually, he landed the position of deputy prime minister of 
the breakaway Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 1997. In 2000, Zakayev was wounded 
and fled Chechnya for the United Kingdom. A break between radical and moderate forces 	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operating in Chechnya led to Zakayev’s election as prime minister of the exiled 
government in the United Kingdom.46 The Chechen insurgency later denounced Zakayev 
as a traitor; currently, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria government-in-exile has no 
affiliation with the Islamic insurgency operating in Chechnya today.47 
Zakayev’s government founded the website www.chechenpress.org as a moderate 
political voice, independent from Islamic separatists, advocating for Chechen 
independence as well as ongoing peaceful dialogue with Russia. Since the Russian state 
is increasingly cracking down on online space, www.chechenpress.org provides an 
alternative view of the conflict, as opposed to the predominantly extremist narrative 
portrayed by typical Russian media outlets.48  In the case of Chechnya, ICTs have 
contributed to a more unified exile community. Krag writes, “…individuals with a shared 
political identity are prone to make contact in order to renew former political movements 
in exile. Today, the contact may happen through the Internet and mobile phones…”49 The 
moderate Chechen exile community can now communicate, organize, and mobilize more 
effectively due to these new technological advances. 
ICTs can provide a safety and protection mechanism for local journalists and civil 
society organizations. In particular, new technologies have allowed independent 
journalists a more modern mode of reporting. The North Caucasus is a notoriously 
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dangerous location for media outlets; the Russian state and insurgent groups frequently 
target reporters and rights activists in the area. New media technologies, however, are 
allowing organizations such as The Caucasian Knot, an independent news organization 
focused on events in the North Caucasus, to operate more effectively and under a higher 
degree of protection. Specifically, Gregory Shvedov, editor-in-chief of the Caucasian 
Knot, utilizes Google technologies to consolidate the works of his reporters.50 This allows 
Caucasian Knot to function without a centralized location, as well as to protect the 
anonymity of its contributors.51 Digital-only methods of writing and contributing news 
stories for the area also eliminate the need for traditional brick and mortar news outlets. 
The relative ease at which The Caucasian Knot operates ensures a higher probability of 
its survival in the area and assurance of continued moderate news outlets that may not 
otherwise exist. 
Social media has also allowed the voice of independent news organizations to 
remain intact even when under duress from the state. For instance, the Caucasian Knot 
was the victim of a DDoS attack52 which rendered the website inaccessible to most users. 
However, the website was able to continue to disseminate its articles via social media 
platforms such as Facebook.53 These new alternative platforms of information allow users 
multiple pathways for access, ultimately increasing the difficulty for censorship. 
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In Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan attacks on human rights defenders and 
advocates have become routine. Notably, in 2009 Natalia Estemirova, a prominent human 
rights activist based in Chechnya, was kidnapped and murdered by an unidentified group. 
As a response to Estemirova’s murder, a Swedish group Civil Rights Defenders 
developed a measure to protect North Caucasian activists. Kogan writes, “[Civil Rights 
Defenders] unveiled the ‘Natalia Project’ – named after, and said to be inspired by the 
fate of, Ms [sic] Estemirova: a security bracelet that combines GPS/GSM technology and 
social media to provide rapid responses to threats to HRDs [human rights defenders]”.54 
The device is meant to track the movements of activists in the case of a kidnapping. 
Though it is too early to judge the impact of the “Natalia Project”, it certainly has the 
potential to decrease coercion of North Caucasian civil society activists. 
Modern ICTs have given way to new social movements from previously 
marginalized populations. Few studies on social media have given attention to the 
alternative civil society groups that are now able to communicate more effectively. In the 
North Caucasus, the Circassian diaspora can now mobilize more effectively due to the 
advent of new ICTs.  
The Circassians are an ethnic group indigenous to the Western Caucasus on the 
Eastern coast of the Black Sea. As Russia was expanding its territory into the Caucasus, it 
became involved in a protracted war from 1763-1864 with the sovereign nation of 
Circassia. As a result, the Circassian populations either fled the Caucasus or were 
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forcibly deported to parts of the Ottoman Empire.55 56 Many died of starvation and illness 
during the deportations. The current Circassian diaspora primarily consists of populations 
in Jordan, Syria, Israel, the United States, and portions of Western Europe.57 
Currently, Circassians in the North Caucasus comprise of several ethnically 
homogenous groups: the Adyges, the Kabardins, and the Cherkess. These groups are 
located primarily in the Western Caucasus, in the autonomous republics of Adygeya, 
Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachevo-Cherkessia. In the case of Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Karachevo-Cherkessia, the Circassians share the territory with the Balkars and Cherkess. 
Zhemukhov notes, “Circassian lands were divided, during Stalin’s experiment on 
nationalities, into several small administrative units of different status (autonomous 
republics, oblasts, and regions). These areas did not adjoin each other, and Circassian 
populations were grouped together with unrelated nations”.58 
The Circassian groups have rallied around two major points: notably, the 
recognition of the Circassian genocide by the Russian state in the 19th century and to 
register protest for having the 2014 winter Olympics in Sochi. The city of Sochi, located 
in Krasnodar Krai, holds important historical value for the Circassians. Before the 
Circassians were expelled from Russia, Sochi served as the final capitol of Circassia; 
additionally, the final battle between the Russian empire and the Circassians took place in 
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the nearby Kbaada village, approximately 50 kilometers away. Sochi, to the Circassians 
at large, represents the ultimate blow in the expulsion by the Russians.59  
The advent of online tools as a means of communication has brought together a 
previously marginalized community. Polandov explains that new communication 
technologies have allowed the Circassian diaspora populations around the world a 
platform to communicate, as well as foster their sense of oppressed ethnic identity.60 As 
Morozov notes, “In 2010 a dedicated website was set up to call on residents of the five 
nations to list themselves simply as ‘Circassians’ in Russia’s 2010 census, and an 
aggressive online campaign followed”.61  Previously, before the spread of ICTs, the 
Circassian diaspora in the North Caucasus were geographically isolated from one another 
and had little means of mobilizing. Indeed, most Circassian lobbying activity was located 
inside the Circassian-dominant republics of the North Caucasus. However, since 2009, 
due to the advent of social media, groups have expanded beyond the North Caucasus. 62 
Hansen notes, “A significant portion of the young people are internationally oriented in 
their rights-based approach to civil society action and they have from the outset embraced 
modern technological tools, such as the intern and mobile telecommunication, where they 
often are ahead of the older organizations in their working modalities.”63 As a result, 
multiple forums have emerged as an online gathering space for Circassian nationalists to 	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discuss issues relating to the recognition of a common history as well as an eventual 
repatriation of the Circassian people into Russia.  
YouTube has become a source for information dissemination on the “Circassian 
question.” As of this writing, a search for “Circassia” on YouTube yields over 8,000 
results. Many of the top hits deal with historical Circassian identity. Indeed, within the 
top three videos are expositions on the “fragmentation” of historical Circassia by the 
Russians, as well as an explanation on the various Circassian groups within modern 
Russia. YouTube as a platform for expression has allowed the Circassians to dispense 
their narrative of history and marginalization, counter to the official accounts of the 
Russian state’s actions against the group.  
Finally, new media platforms can document and disseminate issues of abuse from 
the state. The advent of technologies such as cell-phone cameras as well as relatively 
anonymous sites such as YouTube allows virtually anyone to publish a video. An article 
from “The Nation” chronicles the documentation and viral takeoff of one particular 
incident in Chechnya:  
Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s troops started shooting paintball guns at 
Chechen girls not wearing traditional garb on Grozny’s streets. Reporting on this 
incident was first posted on the Knot’s site; it was then picked up by veteran 
reporter Pilar Bonet for the Spanish paper El País. Subsequently, the story was 
carried by many Russian papers, and when Kadyrov’s officials denied reports, a 
video made by the perpetrators themselves was found by Caucasian 
Knot reporters and posted on You Tube. As a result Russia’s ombudsman for 
human rights, Vladimir Lukin, appealed to the procurator general and an 
investigation was opened. The outcome is still unclear, but Caucasian Knot’s role 
in bringing attention to injustice was important”.64 
A YouTube channel simply entitled “Chechnya” currently has over 40,000 
subscribers. In the channel are videos demonstrating the radical transformation of 	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Chechnya, in particular the city of Grozny, since the two wars in the 90’s. However, 
deeper within the channel are videos demonstrating Russia’s brutality in the region.65 
Many of these videos document abuses purportedly committed by Russian forces during 
the first and second Chechen wars.  
On December 12, 2013 a YouTube user uploaded a video of Chechen Deputy 
Interior Minister Apti Alaudinov speaking with various regional officials. In the video, 
Alaudinov promotes the use of evidence planting, coercion, and even executions without 
due process for anyone suspected of affiliation with the Islamic militants of the area.66 
This video adds to the existing material documenting purported human rights abuses by 
the state in Chechnya.  Although	  it	  is	  important	  to	  elaborate	  that	  ICTs	  do	  not	  necessarily	  prevent	  the	  occurrence	  of	  harassment	  and	  coercion	  from	  the	  state,	  they	  do	  aid	  in	  documenting	  such	  abuses.	  Tangible	  documented	  evidence	  of	  rights	  violations	  can	  aid	  in	  galvanizing	  support	  from	  international	  groups.	  Additionally,	  YouTube	  videos	  and	  other	  digital	  recording	  platforms	  provide	  almost	  irrefutable	  evidence	  of	  coercion	  that	  prove	  difficult	  to	  discredit.	  	  Ultimately,	  ICTs	  have	  aided	  North	  Caucasian	  civil	  society	  in	  expanding	  its	  influence	  in	  the	  area.	  They	  have	  provided	  civil	  groups	  the	  means	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  the	  state	  via	  offering	  media	  outlets	  independent	  from	  the	  state	  and	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the	  insurgency,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  space	  for	  mobilization	  that	  the	  Russian	  state	  would	  not	  otherwise	  provide.	  	  
 
Social Media and the State 
As civil society and democratic ideals can flourish under new communication 
technologies, the state can use them to repress, subdue, and discredit its populations. How 
do modern authoritarian states use ICTs? Author Rebecca Mackinnon outlines the 
framework of networked authoritarianism in her research on media use in China. She 
notes the difference between a networked and un-networked regime: 
In the networked authoritarian state, while one party remains in control, a wide 
range of conversations about the country’s problems nonetheless rage on websites 
and social networking services. The government follows online chatter, and 
sometime people are even able to use the Internet to call attention to social 
problems or injustices, and even manage to have an impact on government 
policies. As a result, the average person with Internet or mobile access has a much 
greater sense of freedom – and may even feel like they have the ability to speak 
and be heard – in ways that weren’t possible under classic authoritarianism.67 
 
Though Mackinnon was writing on China, a similar dynamic exists in modern 
Russia. According to a report compiled by Freedom House in 2013, the state of Russian 
cyberspace is “partly free” while traditional media sources, such as newspapers and 
television stations, are rated “not free.” While traditional media sources have been 
consolidated by the state, the Internet was previously one of the few forums for free 
speech in Russia. Online dissent is tolerated to a much greater degree in Russia than other 
classic authoritarian states. However, authorities are quickly learning how to effectively 
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control Russian cyberspace.68 In the following section, I will detail how the Russian 
state69 uses ICTs to repress local civil society actors, as well as illiberal groups in the 
North Caucasus. 
How can Russian Internet best be characterized? Deibert and Rohozinski offer a 
nuanced analysis of Russia’s cyberspace practices, illustrating the complexity and 
competing interests of various groups on the Internet: 
…the actions of businesses, governments, civil society, criminal organizations, 
and millions of individuals affect and in turn are affected by the domain of 
cyberspace. Rather than being an ungoverned realm, cyberspace is perhaps best 
likened to a gangster-dominated version of New York: a tangled web of rival 
public and private authorities, civic associations, criminal networks, and 
underground economies.70 
The aforementioned authors present a framework for describing how authoritarian 
states manage, control, and monitor local Internet use; they delineate these practices into 
three “generations” of controls. First generational controls involve direct blocking of 
Internet sites and/or the policing of Internet cafes. Second generational controls generally 
involve more “legal” means of monitoring. For example, websites may be required to 
register within a central state-monitored database and be responsible for all content 
posted. Additionally, the state apparatus may use its power to deter dissent in cyberspace 	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by intimidating bloggers, social media users, and the opposition from posting 
inflammatory, subversive, or anti-regime content. Third generation controls are arguably 
the most sophisticated and difficult to detect. With this last set of controls, governments 
use cyberspace as a tool for information gathering, propaganda distribution and 
demonstrating their base of support.71 
The North Caucasus demonstrates Russia’s use of all three generations of 
cyberspace control. Regarding first generation Internet controls, the North Caucasus 
authorities monitor the activity of Internet cafes and their customers. Within the more 
rural areas of the North Caucasus, some of the only access to the Internet is available 
through cybercafés. Passports are required to use Internet accessible computers in local 
internet cafes. Additionally, authorities regularly police cafes where suspected 
“extremist” material is being viewed.72 This practice effectively renders anonymity 
impossible and discourages any sort of online discussion of dissatisfaction with the 
regime for fear of state reprisal.73 
Online civil society members are also being targeted by the state. In Dagestan, 
there have been numerous incidents of journalists being attacked or murdered by masked 
men. Despite all attempts at protection and anonymity, a journalist for the news website 
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Caucasian Knot was fired upon near his home by a suspected group of extremists.74 One 
prominent Dagestani journalist, Khadzhimurad Kamalov, was gunned down in 2011. 
Kamalov frequently reported on contentious and dangerous issues in the region, such as 
corruption and police brutality. Though the perpetrators were never officially identified, 
the journalist’s name did appear on an “execution list,” consisting of suspected 
collaborators with the local Islamic insurgency.75 76 
The Russian state also employs second generation controls in the North Caucasus 
republics. In 2000, Russian president Vladimir Putin approved the Information Security 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation. This document outlined Russia’s need to increase 
cyber-security with the goal of increasing domestic and international security. Within the 
document are implicit references to the North Caucasian insurgency, particularly “the 
imposition of a ban on the use of electronic media airtime for the distribution of programs 
propagandizing violence…” and “counteracting the negative influence of foreign 
religious organizations and missionaries”.77 Deibert and Rohozinski write that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 "Akhmednabi Akhmednabiev, Correspondent of 'the Caucasian Knot', Attacked." Caucasian Knot, 
accessed December 8, 2013, http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/23067/. 
 
75 Schwirtz, Michael. "Journalist is Shot Dead in Russia's North Caucasus Region." New York Time, 
accessed December 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com /2011/12/17/world/europe/journalist-is-shot-dead-in-
russias-north-caucasus-region.html?_r=1&. 
 
76 "Hajimurad Kamalov Killed in Dagestan had been on a 'Punishment List'." Caucasian Knot, accessed 
December 8, 2013, http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/19352/. 
 
77 "Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation." Ministerstvo Inostrannyh Del Rossijskoj 
Federacii, accessed December 8, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/2deaa9ee15ddd24bc32575d9002c442b. 
 
28	  	  
primary domestic purpose of this doctrine was to limit the online informational influence 
of the Chechen insurgency.78 
The state employs a federal “blacklist” of certain websites deemed inflammatory 
or to contain extremist material. Among these sites is the primary domain controlled by 
the North Caucasian insurgency: Kavkazcenter.com.79 Also blocked are websites to 
North Caucasian jamaats in Kabardino-Balkaria as well as a prominent Ingushetian news 
agency.80 81 In the case of Ingushetia, local authorities blocked access to the alternative 
news site Ingushetia.ru. When webmasters started a companion blog to the site in 
response to its unavailability, it was quickly blocked as well. The regional governor went 
so far as to petition local cellular companies to deny access to Ingushetia.ru and any of its 
affiliates from mobile devices.82  
State officials do not limit their activities to blacklisting websites. They also target 
specific Internet users for “hate speech”, intentions to spark ethnic outrage, or those 
writing on certain political issues in the North Caucasus. In Dagestan, a hotbed of 
insurgency, a social media user took to his odnoklassniki (classmates) account to 
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advocate for a jihad against infidels. A Russian court later fined the user 150,000 rubles 
(approximately 4,500 dollars).83  
Russian authorities closely monitor bloggers writing on contentious issues such as 
human rights or the insurgencies in the North Caucasus. Some North Caucasian bloggers 
report visits from security forces in an effort to coerce and pacify their rhetoric. The 
government reportedly employs around five people to monitor blogs for certain 
keywords, such as “pussy riot” or “Kadyrov.” If such terms are used with high frequency, 
the bloggers risk having their accounts suspended.84 
Third generation controls exist through the social media accounts of the North 
Caucasian governors. North Caucasian authorities, in addition to blacklisting certain 
websites, use the Internet for disseminating propaganda and portraying the situation in 
the area as peaceful. During the rule of Dimitri Medvedev, many Russian governors 
began blogging, particularly after Medvedev’s first video blog entry in 2010. Toepfl 
argues that this quick adoption of ICT’s by the Russian governors was an attempt to 
emulate Medvedev’s activities. Additionally, he posits that these blogs help regional 
leaders maintain legitimacy by acting as a proxy of communication for constituents.85  
Almost all of the North Caucasian governors have some sort of online social 
media presence, via platforms such as Twitter, VKontakte, Facebook, and LiveJournal. 
For example, the governors of Dagestan, Chechnya, and Kabardino-Balkaria are 	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routinely active on their Twitter accounts. For example, the Governor of Dagestan 
Ramazan Abdulatipov provides almost weekly addresses to his Twitter account. His 
“tweets” mostly consist of well wishes for holidays, reports from various governmental 
meetings, or pictures of local momentous events in Dagestan, such as youth congresses or 
celebrations.86 However, lacking in these addresses to the online community is any 
substantive political commentary; rather the tweets of Abdulatipov, as well as other 
North Caucasus governors present the illusion of a business-as-usual political 
environment, where opposition groups and the insurgency are absent. Bode and 
Makarychev write, “…the governors use the blogosphere as a means of highlighting in a 
virtual form their particular identities without jeopardizing relations with the Kremlin.” 87 
One of Russia’s most well-known and visible politicians, the current president of 
Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov is prominent on several social media platforms. As of this 
writing, Kadyrov has more than 19,000 “likes” on Facebook, and 48,000 followers on 
Twitter. Most striking is Kadyrov’s Instagram account. The pictures filling this account 
run the gamut from Kadyrov the falconer, to Kadyrov the serious Russian politician, to 
Kadyrov the everyday man of the people.88 Each of Kadyrov’s photos on Instagram 
generally receives upwards of 5,000 “likes” from his group of followers. It remains 
difficult to disentangle Kadyrov’s actual followers from “faked” online profiles, but his 
social media strategy remains clear. In the face of various allegations of human rights 
abuses, Kadyrov is attempting to construct a competing narrative of his regime as one 	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characterized by near-universal support of his constituents. By publishing photos, blogs, 
tweets with artificial amounts of “likes,” Kadyrov as well as the other governors of the 
North Caucasus inflate the image of their popularity to not only local groups, but to the 
international community as well. 
Though it is important to study how the Russian state censors content through 
various modes of control, it is equally useful to examine what is not present in North 
Caucasian cyberspace. In a study on the Russian blogosphere, it was noted that political 
issues largely dominated the topics of discussion.89 However, among North Caucasian 
blogs, the political dimension is largely absent. Indeed, the most prominent bloggers in 
the North Caucasus prefer to author pieces on personal reflection and life in the area; they 
avoid topics relating to contentious political issues.90 Mari Bst notes that many bloggers 
in the North Caucasus self-censor their content when writing. Instead of fearing 
retaliation by the state for anti-regime sympathies, bloggers omit writing on sensitive 
issues in order to protect their livelihoods and to prevent cultivation of images as 
“dissidents.”91 Through the mechanism of self-censorship, the Russian state can point to 
the lack of anti-authority discourse among North Caucasian Internet users to justify its 
regimes and the practices of its governors. By using self-censorship, local authorities do 
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not need to waste valuable monetary and personnel resources rooting out local online 
oppositionists.  
Though the Russian state was slow to catch on to the nascent public space offered 
by ICTs, it has now adopted these technologies to pursue its own version of “networked 
authoritarianism” on civil society and uncivil society groups in the North Caucasus. ICTs 
are used to coerce, repress, and discredit the aforementioned groups as well as to give 
legitimacy to strong-armed Russian governors in the area.  
 
Uncivil Society and Technology 
 As established earlier, not all civil society groups place demands for democracy 
upon the state. In fact, some may even actively advocate against a democratizing state. 
Like civil society and the state, such groups exist in the North Caucasus and use ICTs to 
advance their agendas. I label these groups “uncivil society” due to the difference 
between them and traditional civil society organizations. In the following section, I will 
first outline my conception of uncivil society, its operatives in the North Caucasus and 
how they operate in the area. Then, I will present evidence to demonstrate how these 
groups have advanced their non-democratic agendas by means of intimidating civil 
society leaders and targeting state resources by the means of ICTs. 
Not all organizations and groups independent from the state fall under the 
traditional umbrella of civil society. Indeed, in the North Caucasus liberal voices are 
frequently attacked, verbally and physically, by organizations that are both anathema to 
the authoritarian state and advocate against democratization. The term “uncivil society” 
has been coined by several authors in a variety of contexts; this work’s operationalization 
33	  	  
of uncivil society stems from author Maha Abdel Rahman. In her work focusing on 
Egypt, Rahman explains that an authoritarian state does not necessarily hold a monopoly 
on the domestic repression of liberal ideas. In the case of Egypt, certain groups 
previously branched under the umbrella term “civil society” contribute to the 
‘privatization of repression.’ She writes, “…the very organisations [sic] that have been 
engaged in a struggle for democracy with the state are contributing to the harassment of 
other elements of civil society with whom they disagree on the form of society and state 
they want”.92  
This element of harassment distinguishes uncivil groups from traditional civil 
society groups. Eschewing traditional discourse and rhetoric, uncivil society groups use 
intimidation, coercion, and violence in an attempt to silence voices advocating for a 
democratic state or rule of law. Vadim Volkov describes these groups as “violent 
entrepreneurs.” Such entrepreneurs consist of organized crime syndicates and security 
personnel acting outside of their formal professions who rival the state in providing 
protection, as well as exerting violent influence.93  The existence of such groups points to 
a “fragmentation” of state resources and ultimately underlines the state’s loss on the 
monopoly of the use of force.94  
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How can illiberal95 groups use ICTs to their advantage? One notable advantage is 
the expanded ability for recruitment.96 Most recruitment tactics used by insurgency 
groups involve personal networks of current members, but they have slowly begun to use 
digital tools as well.97 The Chechen insurgency also used digital media as a tool for 
recruitment and mobilization. Sites such as Kavkazcenter.com and Qoqaz.com used the 
Internet to distribute information on jihad as well as instructions for planning attacks and 
establishing mujahedeen’s elsewhere.98  
ICTs also expand the potential audience for information for groups.99 Indeed, the 
broad scope and penetration of ICT’s allows virtually anyone with an Internet connection 
to access resources dispersed by illiberal groups. The pro-insurgency website 
kavkazcenter.com regularly uses its platform to publish uncorroborated stories on the 
regime of Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov. For example, in 2009 the website 
published an article accusing Kadyrov of having a political “hit list” that was published 
online. No sources were provided for this information.100 Kavkazcenter.com also 
published articles accusing Russian forces of operating a children’s “concentration camp” 
during the second Chechen War. However, the website provided no evidence to support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 For stylistic purposes, I alternate between the terms uncivil society and illiberal groups. The term illiberal 
does not itself refer to a liberal versus conservative divide, but rather anti-democratic, illegitimate, 
prejudicial, and radical forces operating in the North Caucasus. 	  
96 Thompson, Robin L. "Radicalization and the use of social media." 
 
97 Spaiser, Viktoria. "Exploitation of Information and Communication Technologies by Insurgents: A Study 
on Al-Qaeda, Chechen Rebels, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)." M.A. in Conflict, Security, 
and Development, King's College London, 2008. 
 
98 Ibid., 22. 
 
99 Ibid., 21. 
 
100 "Death Squad Stalks Exiled Chechens." Kavkaz Center, accessed December 8, 2013, 
http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2009/01/25/10504.shtml. 
 
35	  	  
this claim.101 Additionally, the website included features illustrating photos and videos of 
insurgents attacking Russian soldiers and waging war with local security forces. 
During the second Chechen war in 1999-2000, the Chechen insurgency used sites 
such as kavkazcenter.com and qoqaz.com to spread information, gain legitimacy, and 
detract support from the Russian government. Indeed, as Russian media coverage on the 
war was generally biased against rebel forces, the insurgency’s coverage of the war 
provided a broader perspective for viewers from the international community. Thomas 
notes that this tactic allowed the insurgency to gain support.102 In one instance, Spaiser 
notes: “In May 2000 for instance Chechen rebels claimed to have shot down a Russian 
SU-24 jet fighter-bomber. Russian officials attempted to discredit the story, but the rebels 
posted photographs on their website showing fighters with parts of the plane’s 
wreckage.”103 
Currently, insurgent groups are using ICTs to discredit information provided by 
local authorities. Predominantly, the Caucasian Emirate is using YouTube to upload 
videos refuting evidence on the deaths of important regional insurgency leaders. Russian 
authorities, in 2012, reported on the death of Dzhamaleyl Mutaliyev, an insurgent leader 
in Ingushetia.104 Later, in 2013, Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov declared that Doku 
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Umarov,105 the head of the Caucasian Emirate, had been killed. Hours after Kadyrov’s 
statement, Umarov uploaded a video of himself to YouTube. In Umarov’s video speech, 
he also refutes claims on the death of Dzhamaleyl Mutaliyev.106 
As ICTs can unite marginalized populations in the case of the Circassians, it can 
also be used as a tool to repress and marginalize civic-minded individuals. Kavkazcenter 
is used by the insurgency to discredit as well as intimidate moderate Islamic leaders 
domestically and abroad. A 2009 posting on the website decreed that moderate leader-in-
exile Akhamd Zakayev had been sentenced to death by an Islamic court and declared an 
international fatwa against him.107 Such use of ICTs demonstrates their potential for 
intimidating moderate leaders into silence. In Chechnya, the pro-insurgency website 
Kavkazcenter.com developed a “wanted list” of soldiers and local politicians who had 
purportedly gone against the insurgency during the second Chechen War. The purpose of 
the list was to specifically name local enemies of Islam in an attempt to silence dissent as 
well as promote violence against those identified. 
Insurgency groups in Dagestan have also demonstrated a significant online 
presence. The website vdagestan.com contains a multitude of articles and videos detailing 
the activities of the rogue group against the state. One particular portion of the site 
entitled “Vragi Islama” (enemies of Islam) encourages visitors to send information 
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(names, addresses, etc…) of purported enemies of Islam to be published on the site.108 
Like Kavkazcenter.com, Vdagestan.com is officially banned throughout Russia, but can 
still be accessed with relative ease.  
Videos on islamdin.com, the official website of the Kabardino-Balkarian 
insurgency, show militants, weapons in hand, claiming responsibility for local attacks 
against security personnel and civilians. Other articles on the site take credit for the 
destruction of hotspots that sell alcohol, such as nightclubs and liquor stores.109 110 Most 
notably, the group admits, in videos hosted by the site, to the assassinations of prominent 
moderate civil society leaders in the republic.  
Insurgency groups are no longer limiting their attacks to local security forces. In 
2013, the Islamic insurgency began expanding its activities to include cyberwarfare 
against the Russian state. The shift in tactics appears to be retaliation for the 2014 Winter 
Olympics in Sochi.111 A group calling itself “Anonymous Caucasus”112 posted a video to 
YouTube decrying the Sochi Olympics, noting the site’s historical value for Islamic 
resistance against the Russian state. Anonymous Caucasus vowed to continue its attacks 	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against Russian authorities.113 Earlier in the year, Anonymous Caucasus was responsible 
for several DDoS attacks on two prominent Russian banking websites, rendering them 
temporarily disabled to users.114 The group’s illegitimate activities have continued even 
after the 2014 Winter Olympics drew to a close. In March 2014 the group temporarily 
disabled the websites of the Russian presidency and the central bank. Anonymous 
Caucasus took to its Facebook page to claim responsibility for the attacks.115116 
Conversely, the Kabardino-Balkarian extremists are not only targeting state 
officials or buildings, but moderate civil society leaders as well. In 2010 members of 
local insurgent groups shot moderate Islamic leader Aslan Tsipinov outside of his home. 
Tsipinov drew the ire of the Islamic extremists of Kabardino-Balkaria by invoking 
historical customs and rituals of the Circassians while simultaneously downplaying the 
role of Islam in modern Circassian identity. The Kabardino-Balkarian Emir Zakaria took 
to islamdin.com to proclaim his group’s role in the killing, as well as decry other 
“hypocrites, idolaters, and necromancers.”117 
ICTs have provided uncivil society in the North Caucasus another medium 
through which to intimidate journalists and civil society members. Extremist members 
utilize Internet forums and comment sections of online news articles to threaten 	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journalists. Often, journalists are accused of colluding with state bureaus to create pro-
regime propaganda critical of insurgent or nationalist groups. Illiberal groups use ICTs to 
harass and intimidate these moderate voices. For example, one journalist in the republic 
of Dagestan was sent a barrage of threatening text messages before being shot.118 Nadira 
Isayeva, another Dagestani journalist, was also singled-out and targeted. A sexually-
explicit phone conversation, purportedly between Isayeva and her husband, spread virally 
across the web, destroying the reporter’s reputation and forcing her into exile in the 
United States.119120 Tactics such as these discourage moderate reporting voices in the 
North Caucasus and can ultimately blacklist local news organizations.  
Insurgency groups have also used the web as a tool for the acquisition of funds 
and aid. As Conway points out, the site Qoqaz.net (mentioned earlier) set up donation 
links to the Benevolence International Foundation, a non-profit organization purportedly 
established to aid the victims of international conflict. Instead, the group filtered money 
to the bank accounts of Chechen rebel groups, as well as other designated terrorist 
organizations across the globe. Over $700,000 was raised for the groups through these 
means.121 122 Kavkazcenter.com also has a donation tool set up for potential contributors. 	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However, instead of directly donating through the site via bank account transactions such 
as Paypal, the site offers a form to contact the site’s owners; such a tactic would allow 
greater discretion for donors and make it more difficult to directly trace funding sources. 
 The Islamic insurgency is not the sole source of intimidation and violent acts in 
the North Caucasus. Regional conflicts between insurgency and state security forces have 
sparked reactionary movements from nationalist and splinter groups. These groups seek 
to employ attacks against suspected members of local insurgency groups, as well as their 
family members in retaliation for previous instances of violence against local security 
forces. In a video from 2011 since removed by YouTube for violating its terms and 
agreements, a group known only as “Chornye Yastreby” 123 (The Black Hawks) uploaded 
content decrying the Wahhabi influence in Kabardino-Balkaria. Dressed in entirely in 
black with faces and voices obscured, the group criticized the Islamic insurgency in 
Kabardino-Balkaria and vowed retribution for the deaths of civilians.124 A later video 
from the group went viral in the Caucasus; it showed a man, again dressed entirely in 
black, holding a rifle and threatening specific insurgent leaders by name.125 Several 
attacks on the families of suspected militants have occurred; the Black Hawks have 
claimed responsibility for such violent acts.126 
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 Speculation exists that the Black Hawks are merely a front for the local branch of 
the FSB. Indeed, this veiled identity could supposedly allow local officials to carry out 
indiscriminate attacks not otherwise sanctioned by the law, and aid in the maintenance of 
stability in the region. However, a counter-argument can be made against such a notion. 
Namely, the FSB has rarely needed an excuse to exercise its power extra-judicially, since 
many local attacks have purportedly been carried out under the auspices of local security 
forces. 
 Uncivil society groups in Russia have used ICTs to put pressures upon both civil 
society groups and the state. The Islamic insurgency comprises the majority of actors in 
this grouping, although many security personnel acting outside of state capacity 
contribute as well. These pressures, however, are undemocratic in nature and often 
involve coercion and intimidation in practice. ICTs have allowed these groups a larger 
voice and sphere of influence that extends beyond the North Caucasus. Importantly, these 
groups have also adopted Western imagery and tactics (in the case of Anonymous 
Caucasus) in combating civil society and state online media resources. 
 
Conclusion 
 The preponderance of ICTs has led to their diverse use among a wide array of 
actors. In the North Caucasus, civil society utilizes new media formats to unite diaspora 
populations, draw attention to past and current instances of Russian atrocity, and as a 
means to protect local human rights advocates. The Russian state uses these new 
technologies to suppress dissent as well as garner support for local politicians. Finally, 
uncivil society in the area uses social media to wage information warfare, discredit the 
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state security and information apparatuses, and finally to intimidate moderate civil 
society leaders 
Many of the effects of social media have yet to be determined. For instance, in 
2007, after the announcement of the 2014 Winter Olympics being held in Sochi, 
Circassian groups universally demanded its cancellation and recognition of the Circassian 
genocide in the 19th century. The advent of a new Circassian nationalism has fueled inter-
ethnic tensions within the North Caucasus. Grebennikov claims that Circassian elites are 
using this newfound sense of ethnic identity (cultivated by these online communities) to 
consolidate power, and is ultimately a source of instability in the North Caucasus.127 
Indeed, nationalist issues raised by social media could eventually lead to further instances 
of conflict in the already troubled region. Like the cases in Tunisia and Egypt, social 
media may not be a sufficient condition for instability, but could provide the necessary 
condition to hasten ethnic grievances. 
My research lends itself to a broader discussion on the impact of globalization. 
Namely, the goal of this work has been to dispel some of the naivety surrounding the 
increases in available technology around the globe. ICTs are neither a panacea for 
dictatorships, nor a death knell for civil society under authoritarian leaders, but rather 
tools to aid in global communication and the dispersal of information. For better or 
worse, any kind of group or government can utilize these technologies to illuminate or 
subvert.  
This work opens up several important areas of research for not only the region, 
but cross-nationally as well. First, to what degree have ICTs penetrated the region 
compared with the rest of Russia? As ICTs continue to proliferate throughout the region, 	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what effects will they have for stability? Will demands for democratic consolidation 
increase as Internet use in the area rises? Does the Russian state have proper incentive to 
give Internet access to the peoples of the Northern Caucasus? Do ICTs, in their current 
state in Russia, more closely benefit the state or non-state groups? 
Second, what determines the frequency of social media use by Russian officials? 
As noted earlier, most regional Russian politicians have some sort of presence on social 
media platforms. However, some choose to post more content than others. Are certain 
Russian politicians more likely to take an active role on social media than others? For 
example, why is Ramzan Kadyrov, the president of Chechnya, more prominent on social 
media than Rashid Temrezov, president of Karachay-Cherkessia? Additionally, do social, 
economic, or political conditions of the respective republics determine the content of 
these posts? 
Third, where else do researchers notice a similar dynamic between the state, civil, 
and uncivil groups? Are the relationships outlined in this work generalizable to regions 
outside of the post-Soviet sphere? Do weak states in general evince this trend in their 
peripheral regions? 
Ultimately, the study of ICTs in Russia warrants further examination. However, 
this work demonstrates the futility of ascribing a primary utility to the proliferation of 
ICTs. Indeed, the effects of new communication technologies are multi-faceted, complex, 
and variable when introduced to populations with such diverse political and social 
agendas; they cannot simply be placed upon a spectrum of positive and negative effect. 
No one set of actors uses them more effectively than others. Like the printing press 
before them, ICTs have had enormous effects on political and social realms. It is the job 
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of social scientists to identify, measure, and expound upon these effects, as well as their 
causal mechanisms, to better explain methods of interactions between groups in 
authoritarian regimes. 
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